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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee Wilshire Investments, L.L.C. ("Wilshire") agrees with Appellants'
statement of jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE # 1: Whether the trial court's order from which the Appellants seek to
appeal is a final order.
Standard of Review: Because this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, this
Court reviews the issue de novo.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the Utah Court of Appeals properly ruled that because a
trial court reserved ruling on a request for attorneys fees, it lacked jurisdiction to hear
Appellants' appeal.
Standard of Review: Because the Utah Court of Appeals decided the attorneys'
fees issue as a matter of law, this Court reviews the Court of Appeals' decision de novo.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following cases are determinative of the issues presented: ProMax Dev. Corp.
v. Raile, 998 P.2d 254 (Utah 2000).
The following statute is determinative of the issues presented: Utah Code Ann. §§
38-9-1 - 38-9-7 ("Wrongful Lien Act" or the "Act").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In exchange for its making a substantial commercial loan in connection with a real
estate development in Midway, Utah, Appellee required and received security for its loan
that included trust deeds on the properties comprising the development. A material part

of that security was a trust deed (the "Trust Deed" or "Deed of Trust") on property (the
"Anderson Property") owned by Appellants R. Michael Anderson and Robert H.
Anderson. Appellants granted Appellee a lien in the Anderson Property in the form of
the Trust Deed, and Security Title & Abstract Company ("Security Title") in Provo, the
title agency closing the loan, recorded the Trust Deed.
On May 1, 2002, Appellants filed, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7, a Petition
for Removal of Wrongful Lien (the "Petition") in the Fourth Judicial District Court of
Wasatch County, State of Utah, claiming that their grant of the Trust Deed to Appellee
meant nothing—that, allegedly, "Respondent represented to the Andersons that if they
provided a Deed of Trust to Respondent it would never foreclose on the Andersons'
property." [R. at 28 (Appellants' Memorandum in Support of Petition for Removal of
Wrongful Lien at p. 1).] This claim was not only false, it was directly contrary to the
language Deed of Trust. [R. at 40 (Deed of Trust at ^f 25, stating that Deed of Trust is
"absolute and unconditional").] Appellants claimed in their Petition that when the Trust
Deed was recorded, Appellee created a wrongful lien on the Anderson Properly.
Appellee responded to Appellants' assertions by demonstrating to the trial court that (1)
Appellee had loaned substantial amounts of money in connection with a development that
includes the Property, (2) the Trust Deed that Appellants specifically granted to Appellee
to help secure Appellee's loans was an integral and material part of the loan transaction,
and (3) Appellants themselves signed the Trust Deed and authorized its recordation.
Seven days after Appellants filed their Petition, they requested a summary
proceeding hearing on the Petition pursuant to section 38-9-7 of the Act. The next day,
v

on May 8, 2002, the trial court conducted the summary proceeding hearing on
Appellants' Petition. After carefully reviewing the issue, the trial court concluded that
because Appellants indisputably signed the Trust Deed, the Trust Deed could not
constitute a "wrongful lien" as that term is defined under Utah's Wrongful Lien Act.
Section 38-9-1(6) of the Act, which defines the term "wrongful lien," provides in
relevant part:
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real properly and at the time
it is recorded or filed is not:
* * #

(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of
the real property.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6) (emphasis added).
The trial court held that because Appellants admitted that they signed the Trust
Deed, Appellee's lien on the Anderson Property was not wrongful under the Wrongful
Lien Act. Accordingly, the trial court refused to summarily nullify Appellee's lien and
dismissed Appellants' Petition seeking summary nullification of Appellee's lien,
concluding that pursuant to the express terms of the Act, "[a] summary proceeding under
this section [such as that brought by the Appellants] is only to determine whether or not a
document is a wrongful lien." Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7(4).
Upon determining that Appellee's lien was not "wrongful," the trial court properly
refused to make any further declaration regarding the parties' property rights. Instead, at
the time the trial court made its ruling, it specifically held that its ruling only went to the

issue of summary removal of the alleged wrongful lien and that the court's ruling in no
way affected Appellants' rights to pursue any other available legal remedies.
The trial court also exercised its discretion and reserved ruling on Appellee's
request for attorneys' fees made pursuant to section 38-9-7(5)(c). That section provides
in relevant part:
If the court determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall dismiss
the petition and may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the lien
claimant.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7(5)(c).
In reserving its judgment on Appellee's attorneys' fees request, the trial court
stated that it would consider the request at a later time should Appellants choose to
continue to litigate any other legal remedies.
Appellants appealed the trial court's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals,
claiming that the trial court incorrectly denied its request for summary nullification of the
lien at issue. The Court of Appeals ultimately held that because the trial court reserved
ruling on Appellee's request for attorneys' fees, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction
to hear the appeal. The Court of Appeals correctly decided that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear Appellants' appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

In their May 1, 2002 Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien, Appellants asserted

five claims for relief:
a.
Declaratory Relief. For a declaration that Appellee's lien was a wrongful
lien as defined in Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1.
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b.
Quiet Title. For an order quieting title in Appellants pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §38-9-7(5)(a).
c.
Damages.
Code Ann. §38-9-4.

For damages as provided for by the Wrongful Lien Act, Utah

d.
Treble damages.
For treble damages for intentionally filing a wrongful
lien, as provided for by the Wrongful Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4.
e.
Attorney's fees.
For attorney's fees as provided for by the Wrongful
Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(5)(c).
[Appellee's Addendum A, Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien Pursuant to U.C.A. § 38-97; Brief of Appellants ("Appellants Brief) at p. 3.]
2.

After the initial hearing on Appellants' Petition held by the trial court on

May 8, 2002, Appellee filed with the trial court, on May 10, 2002, a proposed Findings,
Conclusion, and Order Dismissing Petitioners' Petition for Removal of Wrongful Lien
and Denying Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial. [R. at 174.]
3.

Appellants in response filed a Notice of Objections to Respondent's Proposed

Form of Order (Appellants' "Objections"). In its Objections, Appellants argued to the trial
court as follows:
3.
That the Court's denial of Petitioners' claim of wrongful lien did not
determine all of Petitioners' claims in the Petition is confirmed by U.C.A.
§38-9-4(3)(b)(c) which clearly states that the grounds for proceeding under
the wrongful lien statute are not limited to wrongful lien but also include
cases where the document filed as a lien is "groundless, contains a material
misstatement or false claim." Petitioners in their memorandum to the Court
and in their oral submissions argued at length those facts showing that the
contested Deed of Trust was groundless, contained a material misstatement
and was a false claim. The Court specifically acknowledged that it could
not at a summary proceeding determine those claims.
4.
In that regard, the Court responded to Petitioners claims of fraud,
mis-delivery and lack of consideration (which claims are the basis for

i n n

Petitioners proceeding under U.C.A. §38-9-4(3)(b)(c)) by specifically
finding, "Clearly you might have a very good case with respect to the other
issues. And if it is good it will proceed on the basis of summary
judgment." This was a specific acknowledgment by the Court that it was
not dealing with any issue at the hearing except wrongful lien;
5.
The Court's specific comment that, "How would I—otherwise we
would have to have a full trial at this particular hearing as to all of these
things you've raised.", the Court's comment that "[Summary disposition] is
a proceeding that does not anticipated any discovery, that does not
anticipate too much of an evidentiary hearing.", and the Court's finding
that, "Other than that you have—it clearly states in the statute it does not
prevent you from proceeding with any other remedies." proves that the
Court in denying the claim for wrongful lien could not dispose of an was
not disposing of all of the issues before it at the summary proceeding.
[R. at 169-171.]
4.

On July 17, 2002, the trial court held a hearing on Appellants' Objections.

When the trial court issued its ruling at the conclusion of this hearing, the following
exchange occurred between the trial court and Appellants' counsel:
THE COURT: [R]ight now the only thing before me, your petition for
removal cites the definitions of wrongful lien under 38-9-1 and says right—
it's a prayer to your petition. It says, "Court order declaring the deed of trust
void ab initio as a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 38-9-1."
And I found at the last hearing that it did not meet the wrongful lien definition
under 38-9-1. There's nothing else before the Court.
MR. ADY: Well, we also brought an action, Paragraph 2, to quiet title
in the Andersons. And we also, in Paragraph 3, asked for treble damages
pursuant to 38-9-4.
THE COURT: Okay. You have the right to those type of, you know,
but not under the summary proceedings. The summary proceeding statute
specifically says if a petition contains a claim for damages, the damage
proceeding may not be expedited under this section.
MR. ADY: Correct. I agree, sir.
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THE COURT: And so you might have a claim for damages under 389-4 and I have said that you can pursue that. And if you have quiet title
action, you can pursue that.
[Appellee's Addendum B, Transcript of July 17, 2002 hearing, Fourth Judicial District
Court, Case No. 020500229 before Judge Donald J. Eyre at pp. 47-48.]
5.

At the July 17, 2002 hearing, the trial court also held that "as a conclusion of

law [the Trust Deed] is not a wrongful lien and therefore the Court dismisses that portion of
the Plaintiffs petition that asks for the Court to nullify the lien. It does not deal with the
issues of 'quiet title.' It does not deal with the issue of potential monetary damages under
38-9-4 if it [i.e., Appellants] can prove those other provisions that might subject the
Respondent to civil liability." [Id. at p. 52.]
6.

On August 9, 2002, the trial court entered the Findings, Conclusion, and

Order Dismissing Petitioners' Petition for Removal of Wrongful Lien and Denying
Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial (the "Order"). The Order states, in relevant
part:
1.
That portion of Petitioners' Petition that asserts a wrongful
lien under Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1(6), et seq. is hereby dismissed;
* # *

3.
Respondent's request for an award of costs and attorney's
fees is denied at this time. The request is reserved for consideration by the
Court at a later date should this case continue;...
[R. at 304-306; Appellants' Addendum C ]
7.

After the Appellants again objected to the form of the proposed Order

following the second hearing in the matter, the trial court issued a ruling stating that it had
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closely reviewed the proposed Order and determined that it fairly reflected the trial court's
ruling. The trial court stated it was that day executing
the Findings, Conclusions and Order Dismissing Petitioner's Petition for
Removal of Wrongful Lien and Denying Motion for Reconsideration or New
Trial. The Court has stated at both hearings in this matter that Ihe denial of
their Petition to Nullify Lien in no matter affects their rights to pursue other
legal remedies as set forth in Section 38-9-7(4) U.C.A.
[R. at 302; Appellee's Addendum C, Ruling, Fourth Judicial District Court, Case No.
020500229, entered on August 9, 2002 by Judge Donald J. Eyre (emphasis added).]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants argue that the trial court's August 9, 2002 Order is a final order. In
particular, Appellants assert that (1) the trial court failed to preserve their claims for quiet
title and damages in its written Order despite the fact that the court verbally stated at the
July 17, 2002 hearing regarding Appellants' Petition that it would preserve those claims;
and (2) because each of the claims asserted in Appellants' Petition allegedly turn on the
issue of whether Appellee's lien is a wrongful lien and because the trial court held that
Appellee's lien is not wrongful, the trial court's holding "can only be construed as
dismissing Appellants' entire petition." Appellants' Brief at p. 11.
Contrary to Appellants' assertions, the record in this matter clearly demonstrates that
the trial court expressly preserved Appellants' quiet title and damages claims after finding
that Appellee's lien was not wrongful.

As Appellants are well-aware, the trial court

preserved these claims after Appellants ardently argued to the court that its decision in a
summary proceeding that Appellee's lien was not wrongful did not preclude Appellants
from pursuing their quiet title and damages claims. Because the trial court expressly
xi

preserved these claims based on Appellants' request, the trial court's Order is not a final
order. Appellants' appeal is therefore improper.
Appellants also claim that the Utah Court of Appeals wrongly concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellants' appeal. The Court of Appeals held that it lacked
jurisdiction because the trial court had reserved ruling on Appellee's request for
attorneys' fees, in reasonable anticipation that Appellants would continue to pursue their
quiet title and damages claims given the fact that Appellants had insisted the trial court
preserve those claims. Because Appellants never pursued their remaining claims, the
Court of Appeals found that the trial court was not given the opportunity to resolve the
issues of attorneys' fees.
Appellants argue that the Court of Appeals' decision is wrong because Appellants
merely advised the trial court of an intention to amend their pleadings and the trial court
had no authority to reserve jurisdiction to itself on the basis of Appellants' mere
statement of an intention to amend. Appellants' argument is a red herring. While the
Appellants discussed with the trial court possibly amending their pleadings to add
additional defendants during the July 17, 2002 hearing, it is clear from the context of that
hearing and the trial court's Order that the trial court reserved judgment on Appellee's
attorneys' fees claim pending Appellants' pursuit of their quiet title and damages claims
that Appellants' urged the trial court to preserve. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
correctly found that trial court was not given an opportunity to resolve the attorneys' fees
issue because Appellants failed to pursue their pending claims.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER FROM WHICH APPELLANTS SEEK TO
APPEAL IS NOT A FINAL ORDER.
Appellants argue that the trial court's Order dated August 9, 2002 (the "Order"),

disposed of Appellants' case in its entirety and is therefore a final order. Appellants'
argument contradicts their own arguments made to the trial court and ignores the plain
language of the Order and the trial court's August 19, 2002 written Ruling in this case.
Appellants argue that because each of the claims contained in their Petition were
predicated upon a finding of wrongful lien, the trial court's finding in the Order that
Appellee's lien was not a wrongful lien disposed of all of Appellants' claims on the merits.
[Appellants' Brief at p. 11.] Thus, according to Appellants, paragraph 1 of the trial court's
Order which dismisses "that portion of Petitioners' Petition that asserts a wrongful lien
under Utah Code Ann. 38-9-1 et seq. . . ." can only be construed as dismissing Appellants'
entire Petition. [Id.]1 Appellants' argument ignores, however, the fact that Appellants made
the exact opposite argument to the trial court in objecting to the proposed form of the Order
submitted by Appellee and that, based on Appellants' arguments, the trial court expressly
preserved Appellants' claims for quiet title and damages.

1

Appellants also argue that the trial court's Order failed to preserve Appellants' claims
under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7(5)(a) (for quiet title) and Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4 (for
damages for a groundless lien or material misstatement of facts) by omitting any specific
reference preserving those claims. [Appellants' Brief at pp. 9, 15-16.] As demonstrated
below, the trial court in fact specifically preserved these claims in its August 19, 2002
ruling, as expressly requested by Appellants.

1

Upon completion of the first hearing held by the trial court on Appellants' Petition
and after Appellee submitted a proposed order to the trial court, Appellants filed a Notice of
Objections to Respondent's Proposed Form of Order (Appellants' "Objections"). In its
Objections, Appellants argued to the trial court as follows:
3.
That the Court's denial of Petitioners' claim of wrongful lien did not
determine all of Petitioners' claims in the Petition is confirmed by U.C.A.
§38-9-4(3)(b)(c) which clearly states that the grounds for proceeding under
the wrongful lien statute are not limited to wrongful lien but also include
cases where the document filed as a lien is "groundless, contains a material
misstatement or false claim." Petitioners in their memorandum to the Court
and in their oral submissions argued at length those facts showing that the
contested Deed of Trust was groundless, contained a material misstatement
and was a false claim. The Court specifically acknowledged that it could
not at a summary proceeding determine those claims.
4.
In that regard, the Court responded to Petitioners claims of fraud,
mis-delivery and lack of consideration (which claims are the basis for
Petitioners proceeding under U.C.A. §38-9-4(3)(b)(c)) by specifically
finding, "Clearly you might have a very good case with respect to the other
issues. And if it is good it will proceed on the basis of summary
judgment." This was a specific acknowledgment by the Court that it was
not dealing with any issue at the hearing except wrongful lien;
5.
The Court's specific comment that, "How would I—otherwise we
would have to have a full trial at this particular hearing as to all of these
things you've raised.", the Court's comment that "[Summary disposition] is
a proceeding that does not anticipated any discovery, that does not
anticipate too much of an evidentiary hearing.", and the Court's finding
that, "Other than that you have—it clearly states in the statute it does not
prevent you from proceeding with any other remedies." proves that the
Court in denying the claim for wrongful lien could not dispose of an was
not disposing of all of the issues before it at the summary proceeding.
[R. at 169-171.]
The trial court then ordered a hearing on Appellants' Objections which was held on
July 17, 2002.

2

When the trial court issued its ruling at the conclusion of the July 17, 2002 hearing,
the following exchange occurred between the trial court and the Appellants' counsel:
THE COURT: [R]ight now the only thing before me, your petition for
removal cites the definitions of wrongful lien under 38-9-1 and says right—
it's a prayer to your petition. It says, "Court order declaring the deed of trust
void ab initio as a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 38-9-1."
And I found at the last hearing that it did not meet the wrongful lien definition
under 38-9-1. There's nothing else before the Court.
MR. ADY: Well, we also brought an action, Paragraph 2, to quiet title
in the Andersons. And we also, in Paragraph 3, asked for treble damages
pursuant to 38-9-4.
THE COURT: Okay. You have the right to those type of, you know,
but not under the summary proceedings. The summary proceeding statute
specifically says if a petition contains a claim for damages, the damage
proceeding may not be expedited under this section.
MR. ADY: Correct. I agree, sir.
THE COURT: And so you might have a claim for damages under 389-4 and I have said that you can pursue that. And if you have quiet title
action, you can pursue that.
[Appellee's Addendum B at pp. 47-48.] At that same hearing the trial court also held that
"as a conclusion of law [the Trust Deed] is not a wrongful lien and therefore the Court
dismisses that portion of the Plaintiffs petition that asks for the Court to nullify the lien. It
does not deal with the issues of 'quiet title.' It does not deal with the issue of potential
monetary damages under 38-9-4 if it [i.e., Appellants] can prove those other provisions that
might subject the Respondent to civil liability." [Id. at p. 52.]
After the Appellants again objected to the proposed form of order following the
second hearing in the matter, the Court issued a ruling stating that it had closely reviewed

^

the proposed Findings, Conclusions and Order and determined that they fairly reflected the
trial court's ruling. The trial court stated it was that day executing
the Findings, Conclusions and Order Dismissing Petitioner's Petition for
Removal of Wrongful Lien and Denying Motion for Reconsideration or New
Trial. The Court has stated at both hearings in this matter that the denial of
their Petition to Nullify Lien in no matter affects their rights to pursue other
legal remedies as set forth in Section 38-9-7(4) U.C.A.
[Appellee's Addendum C]
It is clear from the record in this case that the trial court specifically ruled that it
denied Appellants' Petition so far as it sought summary disposition on the issue of whether
Appellee's lien was wrongful and that it specifically preserved Appellants' claims for quiet
title and damages, as expressly requested by Appellants.

Accordingly, contrary to

Appellants' claim, the trial court's Order is not a final order.
The appellate courts in Utah repeatedly have stated that, absent the grant of
permission to file an interlocutory appeal, which has not occurred in this case, non-final
orders are not appealable and, in the event of an appeal, must be dismissed. In A J, Mackay
Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d (Utah 1991), the Court stated that an appeal of an order
that was not final and neither certified nor eligible for certification under Utah Rule of Civil

2

Indeed, findings beyond those actually made by the trial court would have contradicted
the express language of 38-9-7(4), which provides that in the context of a petition to nullify
lien, which is what the Appellants sought,
[a] summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or
not a document is a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not determine any
other property or legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of
any party.
Id.
4

Procedure 54(b) is not properly taken and should be dismissed. Many other decisions by
Utah courts make this clear. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099
(1991) (setting forth standards for whether an order is final); Donohue v. Mouille, 913 P.2d
776 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (a party's failure to have an order certified for appeal under Rule
54(b) deprives the appellate courts of jurisdiction over the appeal); Olson v. Salt Lake City
School Dist, 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986) (no final order where trial court's order disposes of
request for declaratory or injunctive relief but leaves unresolved other claims); Pate v.
Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984) (order that does not wholly dispose of a
claim or a party is not "final" and thus is not appealable).
In this case, the trial court denied the relief the Appellants sought in the form of
summary removal of an allegedly wrongful lien. That was the entire context of the trial
court's ruling. The trial court's order is not a final order, and thus the order is not appealable
as a matter of right. This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the appeal, and the appeal
should be dismissed.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT BECAUSE
THE TRIAL COURT RESERVED RULING ON APPELLEE'S REQUEST
FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES, IT LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR
APPELLANTS5 APPEAL.
Appellants also argue that the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the

Appellants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals found in its February 5,
2004 decision that because the trial court had reserved its ruling on Appellee's request for
attorneys' fees until "other potential claims were resolved," and because those potential
claims were not pursued by the Appellants, Appellee's claim for attorneys' fees remains

5

pending before the trial court and therefore the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear
the Appellants' appeal. [A copy of the Court of Appeals' February 5, 2004 decision is
attached as Addendum B to the Appellants' Brief.]
Appellants argue that the Court of Appeals February 5, 2004 decision is wrong
because it "would have the trial court's ability to reserve jurisdiction on the issue of
attorney's fees turn on whether the Appellants merely advised the trial court of an intention
to amend, without having before the trial court any actual Rule 15 motion to amend
pleadings." [Appellants' Brief at p. 12.] In other words, Appellants argue that the trial
court's order regarding their petition to nullify Appellee's lien was final, that they had no
potential claims left before the trial court, and that the trial court refused to deal with the
issue of attorneys' fees. Appellants' argument is a red herring and is inconsistent with and
ignores the context of the rulings of the trial court regarding Appellants' Petition and
Appellee's request for attorneys' fees.
As set forth above, in their Petition, Appellants requested five separate claims for
relief. In their first claim for relief, Appellants sought a declaratory order from the trial
court that Appellee's lien was wrongful under section 38-9-7(5)(a) of the Wrongful Lien
Act. Appellants also asserted claims for quiet title, damages and attorneys fees. In making
its rulings in this matter, the trial court specifically held that it was dismissing only that
portion of Appellants' Petition that asks for the Court to nullify Appellee's lien as a
wrongful lien and that the trial court's Order did not deal with Appellants' claim for quiet
title and damages.

6

It is in the context of this ruling that the trial court held that Appellee's "request for
an award of costs and attorney's fees is denied at this time. The request is reserved for
consideration by the Court at a later date should this case continue."

[Appellants'

Addendum Cat p. 3, f 3.]5
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling makes clear that it did not dispose of Appellants'
claims for quiet title or damages and that it would consider Appellee's request for attorneys'
fees at a later date when Appellants' remaining claims, (i.e. quiet title and damages), if
pursued by them, were resolved.

The Court of Appeals therefore correctly ruled that

because Appellants did not pursue their remaining claims, the trial court was not given an
opportunity to resolve the issue of Appellee's request for attorneys' fees. It is clear from the
foregoing that Appellants' claim that the trial court reserved ruling on the attorneys' fees
issue because Appellants had indicated that they might amend their pleadings is incorrect.
The court reserved its ruling on Appellee's attorneys' fees claim in anticipation that
Appellants would pursue their pending claims for quiet title and damages.
Under this Court's decision in ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 998 P.2d 254 (2000)4,
the Court of Appeals properly held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellants' appeal.

3

The Wrongful Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7(5)(c), provides: "If the Court
determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall dismiss the petition and may
award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the lien claimant. .."
4

The Court of Appeals relied on this Court's decision in ProMax in support of its ruling. In
Promax, this Court held that "[a] trial court must determine the amount of attorneys' fees
awardable to a party before the judgment becomes final for the purposes of an appeal under
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3." Promax, 998 P.2d at 254.

7

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should affirm the February 5, 2004
decision of the Court of Appeals and dismiss Appellants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
DATED t h i s " ^ ^ day of December, 2004
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE

By:
Mark F. James
Mark H. Ric
Attorneys for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing to be
Prth
mailed by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, this L> day of December, 2004, to the
following:

Ronald Ady
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDA
CONSITING OF
Addendum "A"

Appellants' Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien Pursuant to
U.C.A. § 38-9-7.

Addendum "B"

Transcript of July 17, 2002 hearing, Fourth Judicial District
Court, Case No. 020500229 before Judge Donald J. Eyre.

Addendum "C"

Ruling, Fourth Judicial District Court, Case No. 020500229,
entered on August 9, 2002 by Judge Donald J. Eyre.
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259483
RONALD ADY (#3694)
10 West 100 South, Ste 425
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Tel (801)539-1900
Attorney for the Petitioners/Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

R. MICHAEL ANDERSON and ROBERT
H. ANDERSON,
Petition ers/PIaintiflj
vs.

PETITION TO NULLIFY WRONGFUL
LIEN PURSUANT TO U.C.A. § 38-9-7

WH.SH7RE DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C,
Respondent
WILSHIRE DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,
MARC S. JENSON, BRUCE MABEY, THE
SPRINGS OF ST. MORITZ RESORT,
JLL.C, DAVID G. TURCOTTE, BRENT V.
WOODSON and DOES 1 through V.

Civil No. O'-?- O S>~ O C11 *)
Judge D O M A . - O -J> £Y«.t?

Defendants.

PETITIONERS R. Michael Anderson and Robert H Anderson, by and through their counsel
of record, petition the Court for summary relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann §38-9-7 to nullify, void
and remove a Deed of Trust that was wrongfully recorded upon certain of Petitioner's real property
located in Midway, Utah.
IN SUPPORT of their petition Petitioners submit the accompanying memorandum and
affidavits concurrently filed on their behalf.

-ATA-

UPON ££•;
SINDT CONS fABLf//f/

59

(JZ}fl\SW5iW$9r-

ii.

In the event Wilshire had to foreclose to recover on its security Wilshire would
have the lands in Idaho and other property in Utah as security^dJUtteuld
foreclose first on those properties amfwouldtiot proceed against the Andersons'
property,

Hi.

The $4,9 million Deed of Trust to Wilshire on the Andersons' property was not
to secure Andersons repayment of that sum to Wilshire Instead, it would secure
Andersons contractual commitment to sell the Property to the Respondent's
developer Because the Andersons' property would generate most of the profits
in the development, this in turn would ensure that the Respondent's developer
would have the numbers to obtain construction financing for that development
In turn, that construction financing would take out the Deed of Trust for $4 9
million recorded against the Andersons property, against the Idaho lands and
against the other Utah property.

5.

By a letter dated February 25, 2002 Respondent denied that it had made any such

representations to the Andersons and by that denial declared its fraudulent intent in procuring the
Andersons signatures on the Deed of Trust.
6 On or about August 21,2001 Andersons deposited that Deed of Trust with Respondent's
closing agent, Security Title. In making that deposit the Andersons specifically relied upon the
Respondent's representations referred to in paragraph 4 above and upon Respondent's closing
instructions to its closing agent that $2 365 million in funds held by that closing agent were not to be
released unless and until Respondent placed another $1,5 million for the purchase of the Idaho lands
that would ensure that the Property would not be foreclosed upon by Respondent
RONALD ADY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
10 West 100 South. Ste, 425
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
(801)555-1900
3

FAX (801)322-1054

12 Because the Deed of Trust was recorded
i

with signatures that were fraudulently procured, or

ii

without the Andersons authorization,

and because Respondent has, despite the fact that it had no recordable interest in that Deed of Trust,
claimed the full benefit of that Deed of Trust, the Deed of Trust is a "wrongful lien" as that term is
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1.
13. Further and in the alternative, because the Deed of Trust was recorded as a result of the
itesdemofi^ftiistak^i delivery of to D$ed ofTrust for recording and because Respondent has, despite
the fact that it had no recordable interest in that Deed of Trust, claimed the full benefit of that Deed
of Trust, the Deed of Trust is a "wrongful lien" as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1.
14 Further and in the alternative, because the Deed of Trust was recorded as a result of the
«i^©IIge»^W^

and because Respondent has,

despite the fact that it had no recordable interest in that Deed of Trust, claimed the full benefit of that
Deed of Trust, the Deed of Trust is a "wrongful lien" as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann § 389-1.
15. Further and in the alternative, because the Deed of Trust was recorded as a result of the
R^pOfttfirtff

fiatidttoi^v^

Respondent has,

despite the fact that it had no recordable interest in that Deed of Trust, claimed the fall benefit of that
Deed of Trust, the Deed of Trust is a 'Wongful lien'* as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann § 389-1.
16 On February 8, 2002, Andersons caused its attorney, Ronald Ady, to give the Respondents
written notice that the Deed of Trust was a wrongful lien on the Property.
RONALD ADY

5

ATTORNEY AT LAW
10 West 100 South, Ste 425
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
(801)539-1900
FAX'(801) 322-1054

26, Because Andersons did not authorize the Respondent to record the Deed of Trust, or because
Andersons signatures on that Deed of Trust were procured by fraud, and because Respondent has,
despite the fact that it had no recordable interest in that Deed of Trust, claimed the full benefit of that
Deed of Trust, the Deed of Trust is a '"wrongful lien" as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann § 389-1.
27. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7(5)(a), Andersons are entitled to an order from the Court
establishing and declaring that the Deed of Trust is a "wrongful lien" and thus, a nullity and void ab
initio.

SECOND CLAIM OF RELIEF
(Releasing Property from Deed of Trust and Quieting Title)
28. Andersons incorporate all of the allegations the prior paragraphs of this Petition herein.
29. Because Andersons did not authorize the Respondent to record the Deed of Trust, or because
Andersons signatures on that Deed of Trust were procured by fraud, and because Respondent has,
despite thefact that it had no recordable interest in that Deed of Trust, claimed the full benefit of that
Deed of Trust, the Deed of Trust is a "wrongful lien" as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann § 389-1.
30 Pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 38~9-7(5)(a)% Andersons are entitled to an order from the Court
releasing the Property from the Deed of Trust, and quieting Andersons's title to the Property as
against the Deed of Trust, and providing that a certified copy of said order may be recorded with the
Wasatch County Recorder to remove the Deed of Trust of record (See Utah Code Ann § 38-9-7)

RONALDADY
ATTORNEY AT WW
10 West 100 South, StQ, 425
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 64101
(801)539.1900
7

FAX (801)322-1054

39. Respondents are liable to Andersons in the amount of $1,000 or for treble Andersons's actuaJ
damages, whichever is greater, plus attorneys' fees. (See Utah Code Ann § 38-9-4(2).)

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Damages For Intentional Filing of Wrongful Lien)
40. Andersons incorporate all of allegations of the prior paragraphs of this Petition herein.
41 Because Andersons did not authorize the Respondent to record the Deed of Trust, or because
Andersons signatures on that Deed of Trust were procured by fraud, and because Respondent has,
despite the fact that it had no recordable interest in that Deed of Trust, claimed the full benefit of that
Deed of Trust, the Deed of Trust is a "wrongful lien" as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 389-L
42 hjrsuant to Utah Code Ann, § 38-9-4, a person who records or files, or who causes a document
to be recorded or filed, when that person knows, or has reason to know that the document is a
wrongful lien, or is groundless, or contains a material misstatement or false claim, is liable to the
record holder of the property in the greater of the amount of $3,000 or for treble the record holder's
actual damages, plus attorneys fees.
43. The Respondents knew, or should have known that Andersons did not authorize the recording
of the Deed of Trust.
44. As a result of the wrongful recording of the purported Deed of Trust, the Respondent is liable
to Andersons for $3,000 or for treble Andersons's actual damages, whichever amount is greater, plus
attorneys' fees and costs, (See Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4(3))

RONALD ADY
ATTORNEY AT WW
10 West 100 South. Ste. 425
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 64101

001} 530-1900
9

FAX* (801) 322-1054

WilKREFORE, Andersons respectftiJJy petition the Court as follows
1.

For an order declaring the Deed ofTrust void ab initio as a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah

Code Ann § 38-9-1,
2.

For an order releasing the Property from the Deed ofTrust and quieting title to the Property

in Andersons as against the Respondents
3.

For statutory single or treble actual damages, to be proved at triaJ» as provided in Utah Code

Ann § 38-9-4.
3.

For attorneys' fees as provided by the Utah wrongful lien statute.

4.

For costs of court.

5.

For such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and appropriate in the

premises
DATED this [±£"day of May, 2002

RONALD ADY
ATTORNEY AT LAW

II

10 West 100 South. Ste. 425
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
($01)539-1900
FAX. 001) 322-1054
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CONDENSED TRANSCRIPT

IN

THE FOURTH
WASATCH

R.
H.

MICHAEL ANDERSON
ANDERSON,

and

JUDICIAL

COUNTY,

DISTRICT

STATE

COURT

OF UTAH

ROBERT

Petitioners/Plaintiffs,

No.

020500229

-vWILSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Respondent,
WILSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
MARC S. JENSON, BRUCE MABEY, THE
SPRINGS OF ST. MORITZ RESORT,
LLC, DAVID G. TURCOTTE, BRENT V.
WOODSON and DORES I through V,

Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendants.

July 17, 2002

TRANSCRIPT OF TAPED PROCEEDING

Reporter:

Diana Kent, RPR

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah

iCourt, LLC

THE REPORTING GROUP
801.532.3441
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Anderson vs Wilshire Investments
Transcript of Taped Proceeding * July 17, 2002
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That deed of trust was only given to them to
facilitate financing and on the specific condition
that the $1.5 million went to fund the purchase of the
lands in Idaho. That was the nature of this
transaction.
Wilshire haa no recordable interest in
that deed of trust and just as the Court in Russell
did, this court can look behind that transaction, look
behind the face of that document, and say, "Yes, the
Andersons signed that; but was there any real
interest, any recordable interest in Wilshire when it
was recorded9" And our point is very simple; on those
circumstances, how can it be? So obviously, I mean it
makes out a prima facie case of fraud.
I subpoenaed in documents today. The
only things I subpoenaed in dealt with that
transaction, Mr. Jensen's affidavit that he filed here
last time, specific matters that relate to that. The
Court has a subpoena on its file. I faxed it up to
the Court. The funds that they had made available to
them to finance this property, whether or not Wilshire
ever had the $1.5 million. Because that all relates
to the issue of whether there was a recordable lien at
the time that THE COURT: Well, how can - you know,
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47
enough, then it's open for the court to proceed in the
Siggard decision or as they did in the Siggard
decision and have a whole long trial. A wrongful lion
is a cause of action that can be pled in the trial.
THE COURT Well, you would not then get
a hearing within ten days, because I can tell you my
trial calendars are now out into March of 2003 And
so — but that is not the purpose for that particular
statute. The purpose of that statute is to, on a
summary basis, have liens removed that are wrongful
pursuant to the definition of the statute. No other
reason. No other purpose.
MR. ADY: Well, admittedly, sir, that's
correct. And if it can be or if a case can be made
within the confines of the summary disposition
proceeding to the satisfaction of the Court that that
is the case, then the Court will deal with it. But
that doesn't preclude the next step of binding the
matter over for trial if the facts are not capable of
determination within the context of a summary
disposition proceeding. Is that not a.reasonable
statement?
THE COURT: I told you from the very
beginning that you can file a complaint and allege any
number of causes of action that you believe you have
PAGE 4 8
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you are talking about — if that was the purpose of
this statute, the legislature intended it, it would
not be a summary proceeding. It would require a
trial. It would require discovery. And that's not
the Court's interpretation of the reason for this
particular statute.
MR. ADY: Well, with respect, sir, it
depends on how complicated the facts are in each case.
If you have a case like Pussell where the Court looks
behind it and looks at the real estate contract, looks
what was done with it and the basis for the notice of
interest, and it was contested — I should have
brought it with me today. I have the transcript of
that hearing. It was contested. The parties argued
back and forth about the merits of what was done. The
Court decided factually in favor of the Petitioners
and said, "We are going to rule in your favor on these
disputed facts." And so the facts apparently were
simple enough in Russell to be dealt with by summary
disposition.
If the facts are complicated enough - and
I recognize that the Court indicated last time that
they thought this case was factually very complex and
there was no way it was going to be resolved through
summary disposition - but if the facts are complicated
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against the Defendants in this matter. But as to
action which — right now the only thing before me,
your petition for removal cites the definition of
wrongful lien under 38-9-1 and says right — it's a
prayer to your petition. It says, "Court order
declaring the deed of trust void ab initio as a
wrongful lien pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 38-9-1."
And I found at the last hearing that it did not meet
the wrongful lien definition under 38-9-1. There's
nothing else before the Court.
MR. ADY: Well, we also brought an
action, Paragraph 2, to quiet title in the Andersons.
And we also, in Paragraph 3, asked for treble damages
pursuant to 38-9-4.
THE COURT: Okay. You have the right to
those type of, you know, but not under the summary
proceedings. The summary proceeding statute
specifically says if a petition contains a claim for
damages, the damage proceeding may not be expedited
under this section.
MR. ADY: Correct. I agree, sir.
THE COURT' And so you might have a claim
for damages under 38-9-4 and I have said that you can
pursue that And if you have quiet title action, you
can pursue that.

CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441
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51
headnote 5, "Under the plain, unambiguous language of
the agreement, Defendants do not have an interest in
the land but an agreement that the Plaintiffs will
grant the Defendants an interest." And then skipping
down, "Thus the agreement does not purport to convey
an interest in land." The Court did all that as a
matter of law. And consistent with the requirements
of the statute, it did not have to determine any other
property or legal rights of the parties nor restrict
other legal remedies of the party. Thank you.
THE COURT: In this matter the Court,
having reviewed the memorandum filed by Counsel,
having heard oral arguments, the Court denies the
motion for new trial, denies the motion for
reconsideration, reaffirms its previous decision. And
with respect to the objections made to the proposed
order that Mr. James had submitted, let me just
indicate that I would request, Mr. James, that you add
these two findings: That the Court does find that the
subject Trust Deed is expressly authorized by Utah
statute, and that the Court finds that the subject
Trust Deed was signed by the owners of the subject
real property. And therefore, as a conclusion of law,
it is not a wrongful lien. And therefore, the Court
dismisses that portion of the Plaintiff's petition
j

'49
MR. ADY: Given your earlier comments,
sir, shall I or am I correct in assuming that you
don't want to hear further submissions on attorneys
fees?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ADY: Okay. Thank you, sir.
MR. JAMES: Now, it may be helpful, just
very briefly, on the Russell v, Thomas case, I don't
know if your Honor has had time to look at that case
and I think that case does give some excellent
guidance. Mine is one printed off of Westlaw so it
may not — it's an advance sheet so it may not track
your copy exactly. But it looks like right towards
the bottom of Page 1249, this is Page 5 of my
printout, the Court first quotes, and this is the
left-hand column, my Page 5 starts with Compare
Blomquist v. Bingham. You see where it's indented,
Compare Blomquist v. Bingham cite.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JAMES: And then the next paragraph
talks about 38-9-7, expedited.
THE COURT: Correct.
MR. JAMES: The next paragraph
specifically defines wrongful lien quoting from the
statute.
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1
THE COURT: Right,
2
MR. JAMES: And then the Court says, "It
3
is undisputed that Subsections B and C of Section
4
38-9-1(6) do not apply. The issue is whether
5
Defendant — and I will submit if it did apply it
6
would end the inquiry. You could decide it under one
7
of those. If one of those applied. It didn't. So it
8
said the issue is whether Defendant's notice of
9
interest was expressly authorized by Section 57-9-4,
which obviously if 57-9-4 says "authorized by chapter 10
and other state or federal statute", the Court has to 11
say, "Is what we are dealing with authorized?" And 12
the Court says this is a notice of interest. To file 13
a notice of interest under section 57-9-4, the person 14
must minimally claim to have an interest in the land. 15
Whether Defendant's interest is an interest in land or 16
17
a contractual right is governed by the agreement
executed by the parties. All those are issues of law. 18
19
Very plainly.
20
Then the Court said, "Well, look at the
agreement." The Court says the agreement, as a matter 21
of law, is unambiguous. It says that. And the plain, 22
unambiguous language of the agreement — and a court, 23
as you know, can interpret an agreement as a matter of 24
law, if it is plain and unambiguous. And moving to
[25

that asks for the Court to nullify the lien.
(BLANK IN THE TAPE, THEN THE AUDIO
PICKS UP WHERE IT LEFT OFF.)
(The Court Continues) It does not deal
with the issue of quiet title. It does not deal with
the issue of potential monetary damages under 38-9-4,
if it can prove those other provisions that might
subject the Respondent to civil liability.
MR. JAMES: Thank you , your Honor. Let
me now just ask, my recollection - and I will need to
look back at the petition - is this petition I believe
purports to name some other Defendants. Is that
right?
MR. ADY: Well, the petition names, but
states no cause of action and says we will amend to do
that later.
MR. JAMES: And I guess where I'm unclear
now is, is that what you intend to do now?
MR. ADY: Right, is amend and add
defendants.
MR. JAMES: And I'm just wondering what
will be the triggering event to prompt a response to
the portion of the petition that I assume deals with
things other than —
MR. ADY: It will be the service of that J

CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441
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4th DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
R MICHAEL ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,

RULING

vs.

Case No: 020500229

WILSHIRE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
Defendant.

Judge: DONALD J. EYRE
Date: 08/09/2002

Clerk: diannb
The above-entitled matter came before the Court upon Petitioner's
Objections to Respondent's Proposed Form of Order on Hearing before
the Court on July 17, 2 002. The Court has reviewed the pleadings
both in support and in opposition to the objections. The Court has
closely reviewed the proposed Findings, Conclusions and Order and
find that they do fairly reflect the decision of the Court at the
hearing on July 17, 2002. The Court has this day executed the
Findings, Conclusions and Order Dismissing Petitioner's Petition
for Removal of Wrongful Lien and Denying Motion for Reconsideration
or New Trial. The Court has stated at both hearings in this matter
that the denial of their Petition to Nullify Lien in no matter
affects their rights to pursue other legal remedies as set forth in
Section 38-9-7(4) U.C.A.
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